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      ABSTRACT 
Secure information encryption via acousto-optic (AO) chaos with profiled optical beams indicates substantially 
better performance in terms of system robustness. This paper examines encryption of static and time-varying (video) 
images onto AO chaotic carriers using Gaussian-profile beams with diffracted data numerically generated using transfer 
functions. The use of profiled beams leads to considerable improvement in the encrypted signal. While static image 
encryption exhibits parameter tolerances within about ±10% for uniform optical beams, profiled beams reduce the 
tolerance to less than 1%, thereby vastly improving both the overall security of the transmitted information as well as the 
quality of the image retrieval. 
Keywords:  acousto-optics, Bragg regime, scattering, Gaussian, Klein-Cook, chaos, image, video, encryption, 
decryption, modulation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As handheld electronic devices become increasingly popular and more powerful, with capabilities of collecting, 
storing, and transmitting images and video, demand for protecting sensitive or personal imagery is increasing. There has 
been a recent uptick of hacked and stolen images, either private or classified government imagery, which are distributed 
illegally online. The ability to easily collect, store, and transmit images and video has great utility, but it also has a 
corresponding potential for harm. There is a growing need for strong protection, in the form of encryption, to prevent 
unauthorized distribution of imagery and data. Encryption for images typically reduces an image to a bit stream and 
applies generic encryption algorithms that work for any binary data. Examples of such algorithms include the Digital 
Encryption Standard (DES), the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the TwoFish cipher, and the BlowFish cipher [1-
3].  The literature on image-specific encryption can be divided into techniques that use optics, and techniques that use 
software or electronic circuits [4,5]. Within these categories, there are approaches that utilize chaos for encryption. This 
is advantageous due to the fact that a chaotic system is sensitive to a set of parameters and initial conditions, which 
serves to create a strong encryption key [6].  In this work, a method for chaotic image/video encryption implemented 
with acousto-optic (AO) devices is studied. 
AO devices controllably diffract light beams using the interaction of light and sound waves. An input light 
beam passes through a crystal in which a piezoelectric device creates acoustic vibrations. These vibrations behave as a 
diffraction grating, causing the deflection of the light beam. AO cells are commonly used in signal processing 
applications, including laser beam deflection, modulation, filtering, and, when used with feedback, encryption/decryption 
[7]. The light and sound frequencies along with various crystal properties determine the characteristics of the deflection. 
A unitless quantity called the Klein-Cook parameter (Q) summarizes these parameters into a single value that determines 
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the operating mode of the device. In the Bragg mode of operation, Q is larger than 8π, and the cell produces only one 
diffracted order [8]. 
To use an AO cell in a feedback loop, the diffracted beam is converted into an electrical signal by a 
photodetector, whose output is amplified, added to an offset, and applied to the acoustic driver for the piezoelectric 
device. If an input signal is applied to the offset and the output is taken from the photodetector, a signal processing 
device is made. These devices exhibit nonlinear dynamics, including mono-, bi-, multistable and chaotic behavior [9-11].  
These dynamic properties, especially chaotic behavior, are useful for signal processing applications such as encryption 
and decryption [12]. 
In order to understand the chaotic behavior and the conditions under which it occurs, two techniques are applied 
to the AO feedback loop: the Lyapunov exponent and bifurcation maps. The Lyapunov exponent is a function of Q, the 
offset value, feedback gain, and input beam intensity, and it quantities when the system is chaotic. Bifurcation maps plot 
the photodetector output versus the optical phase shift or feedback gain, visually showing the threshold between 
bistability and chaos [13]. Both techniques indicate that chaotic bands appear unpredictably on intervals within the 
parameter space. In order to use such passbands of chaos for encryption, it is critical to know what combination of 
parameters produces chaos and the extent of the chaos as the parameters vary [14].  
When the parameters are controlled to produce chaos, the output signal is interpreted as a chaotically encrypted 
version of the input signal applied to the bias driver. The chaotic signal, which is transmitted over a channel, has an 
amplitude that is related to the input signal amplitude via the RF oscillator.  At the receiver, to demodulate the encrypted 
signal, a second AO feedback loop with parameters identical to the transmitter loop is used in the manner of a standard 
heterodyne detector. The locally generated chaos is multiplied with the incoming modulated chaotic signal. The product 
waveform is then passed through a low pass filter (LPF) with cutoff frequency adjusted to accommodate the information 
signal bandwidth, and corrected for a 180º phase shift [12]. For strong encryption, parameter mismatch beyond a small 
threshold will ideally cause demodulation to fail. 
Previous analysis of closed-loop nonlinear properties utilizes the assumption of a uniform plane wave input 
light beam, leading to tractable mathematics for describing the light and sound interaction. This analysis produces 
commonly used expressions for Bragg diffraction, which can be used to model chaos and thereafter the encryption and 
decryption of signals [12]. Such modeling does not capture the effect of realistic, profiled laser beams, and the chaotic 
behavior for a feedback loops using non-uniform profiled beam was shown to be significantly different [14]. For 
example, the location and width of the passbands of chaos are sensitive to input beam profiles [14]. The present work 
uses simulation of feedback loops with profiled, non-uniform input beams for image and video encryption.  
An overview of chaotic encryption with profiled beams is presented in section 2, describing the encryption 
performance for digital data. In section 3, performance results specific to image encryption are described, including 
performance in the presence of parameter mismatch and channel noise. Encryption results for a test video are presented 
in section 4, along with an analysis of the robustness of the encryption to the key parameters. The final section 
summarizes the main results and discusses future work. 
 
2. CHAOTIC ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION WITH PROFILED OPTICAL BEAMS 
Two AO feedback modulators, for transmission and reception, are shown in Fig.1. In the transmitter feedback 
loop, two scattered orders are created from an arbitrary input beam profile. The profiled input light is incident nominally 
at the Bragg angle at the left plane of the cell. The coordinates  ݎ and ݎᇱ are the transverse radial coordinates with respect 
to the direction of the incident field and the diffracted field, respectively. The zeroth- and first-order scattered outputs are 
ܧ଴(ݎ) and ܧଵ(ݎᇱ), ߜ߶஻ is the angular deviation from the Bragg angle	∅஻(≈ ܭ/2݇), and ܭഥ is the acoustic wave vector 
[15]. Using plane wave angular decomposition theory, a profiled beam is represented as a spectrum of its constituent 
uniform plane wave components incident at an arbitrary angle (1+	ߜ)߶஻ where ߜ is a dimensionless measure of angular 
deviation. A set of coupled differential equations leads to expressions for the two scattered output at near-Bragg 
diffraction [11]. Using these expressions, a transfer function formalism is developed by Chatterjee et. al [15].  An inverse 
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Fourier transform is applied to the product of the incident spectrum	ܧ෨୧୬ୡ(ߜ) and the transfer function ܪ෩(ߜ), as shown in 
eq.1 [15].   
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In this equation, ܧ௢௨௧(ݎᇱ; ݎ) is either the first- or zeroth-order output, depending on the transfer function used, ∅஻ is the 
Bragg angle of the sound cell, and lambda is the wavelength. The output spectra are functions of the peak phase delay ߙො଴ 
and the Klein-Cook parameter Q.  
               
Fig.1. Heterodyne scheme for encrypting and decrypting using A-O chaos.   
Previous work presented results using eq.1 with various incident profiles	ܧ௜௡௖(ݎ), and it was found that the 
diffracted profile deviated in shape from the well-known results obtained with the uniform beam assumption, especially 
for high Q values. These deviations lead to significant changes in the behavior of the closed-loop system, as is discussed 
in [14], which strongly effects encryption performance.  Since real laser beams are profiled, it is critical to understand 
and model these behaviors [16]. 
The full hybrid closed-loop AO system (HAOF) in Fig.1 is created by passing the first order diffracted light into 
a photodetector, whose output is amplified and fed back into the acoustic driver. The photodetector current ܫ(ݐ) exhibits 
nonlinear dynamics, first observed in 1978 [11].  If a uniform plane wave input is assumed, then well-known analysis 
leads to an expression for ܫ(ݐ) [11]. To understand the effect of profiled beams, a modified version of this equation was 
developed and used to simulate the system for arbitrary profiles [14]. Equation 2 contains this expression, where the 
function ݂ represents the observed output along the optical phase shift dimension for a non-uniform input profile [14].  
( )[ ] 20 )(~)(ˆ21)( ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −+= TDtItftI phph βα .                                                                                                 (2) 
The function	݂ in general has no closed-form expression, unlike in the uniform plane wave case, where ݂ 
becomes a sine-profile. For the simulations shown in this paper, a Gaussian input profile is used to numerically 
determine	݂. In this equation, ߙො଴ is the peak phase delay, ߚ෨	is the feedback gain, and ܶܦ is the feedback time delay.  The 
time delay is due to the photodetector, amplifier, and the overall physics of the AO cell [11].  
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In order to utilize chaos as a means of encrypting and securely transporting a signal waveform ݏ(ݐ), we apply 
the signal to the bias driver such that the peak phase delay has the form of ߙො = ߙො଴ + ݏ(ݐ) , as shown in Fig. 1. The dc 
offset	ߙො଴ is chosen to be at the center of a chaotic passband, and the range of ݏ(ݐ) does not exceed the width of the 
passband. With this arrangement, the chaotic photodetector current is a modulated version of the input signal, which is 
then transmitted through a channel. At the receiver, the signal is recovered in the manner of standard heterodyne 
detection as shown in Fig. 1.  First, a local chaos wave is generated using a second Bragg cell with matched parameters 
ߙො଴ , ߚ෨, and ܶܦ. The local chaos is then multiplied with the incoming photo-detected modulated chaotic signal, and the 
product is low-pass filtered, using a cutoff frequency adjusted to accommodate the bandwidth of ݏ(ݐ).  
Under certain conditions, the signal ݏ(ݐ) modulates the chaos similar to standard AM, such that the shape of  
ݏ(ݐ) appears in the envelope [12]. However, with the proper choice of parameters, the signal waveform may be 
completely hidden within the chaos. Similar to standard AM, the bandwidth of ݏ(ݐ) it should be less than half the center 
frequency of the chaotic carrier to avoid aliasing, although in reality, the bandwidth should be substantially smaller than 
the chaos frequency. The chaos frequency depends on the ܶܦ through the equation ݂ = 1/(2 ∗ ܶܦ) , and in this work, 
frequencies in the range of 10 MHz are used. 
The results of a simulation of the encryption system, using profiled beams and implemented in Matlab, are 
shown in Fig.2. The input signal ݏ(ݐ) in this example is a periodic square wave with a frequency of a few MHz, and Fig. 
2 illustrates the original square wave, the encrypted signal, and the recovered signal. The encrypted signal clearly has the 
original in its envelope, which is because the system is expected to be an amplitude modulation in some limit [12]. The 
simulation shows that for relatively low feedback gains, the chaos waveform tends to carry the information signal in the 
envelope, in which case the system does not effectively encrypt the signal.  To properly encrypt a signal, we need to hide 
all possible obvious signatures of the signal from the transmitted waveform, which can be achieved by sufficiently 
increasing the gain. This is shown with later simulation results. 
 
Fig.2.  Encryption and recovery of a square waveform using chaos. 
The second example considered here is a binary signal, shown in Fig.3 along with its encrypted and recovered 
versions. In this case, the parameters are chosen such that the original binary signal is not apparent in the encrypted 
chaos signal. Using matched parameters in the receiver, no bit errors occur in this simulation [17].  
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Fig.3. Encryption and recovery using hybrid AO feedback with profiled incident beam 
when Q=20, Λ=1e-4; matched transmitter and receiver keys; ࢼ෩ =3, ࢀࡰ= 0.05 µs, ࢻෝ૙= 2 (after [17]). 
To quantify the effect of random channel noise on bit errors, a random binary signal is transmitted through the 
system for varying levels of fixed-variance channel noise, and the percentage of recovered bits in error is used to 
measure bit error rate (BER). The BER is measured as a function of the ratio of energy per bit to noise power (Eb/N0) 
(with assumed white noise PSD N0/2), and the BER curve is plotted on a logarithmic scale [17]. Fig.4 shows this BER 
curve for the AO chaotic system.  This curve shows marginally higher bit error rates relative to systems that provide no 
encryption, as previously described [17]. 
 
Fig.4. BER versus the ratio of energy per bit to noise power. 
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3. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION OF IMAGES 
 Since a digital image can be reduced to a bit stream, it is straightforward to extend these results to test the 
performance of the closed-loop system with imagery. The results with profiled beams show significantly improved 
quality of signal retrieval as well as much lower parameter tolerance (around ±0.1% per key) relative to the uniform 
beam case, which has high parameter tolerance and has been shown to be far less satisfactory for image recovery.  This 
motivates testing the profiled beam encryption system with digital images to measure the performance improvement. 
Fig. 5 illustrates a block diagram of the image encryption and recovery, using a pair of matched HAOFs in a heterodyne 
modulation scheme. A color version of the standard Lena test image, with 512x512 pixels and 24 bits per pixel, is 
applied under three conditions: matched parameter keys and no channel noise, mismatched parameter keys with no 
channel noise, and matched parameter keys with channel noise. In each case, the quality of the recovered signal is 
measured in terms of bit errors, similar to the previous characterization with binary data. Given a bit rate of 10 Mbits/sec, 
which is determined by the HAOF time delay parameter, an image of this dimension would require about 0.6 sec to 
encrypt and recover.  
 
  
Fig.5. Block diagram for encryption and decryption of images using HAOF modulators. 
 
The first test case applies the digital Lena image to the encryption scheme, using the same matched parameters 
for both the transmitter and receiver HAOFs. In this case, as was previously shown for PCM signals, the bit error rate is 
effectively zero, and the recovered image is identical to the original. Figure 6 illustrates this result, along with the 
encrypted version of the image, which has no visible remnant of the original. The encrypted image is formed by 
attempting to directly low-pass filter the chaotically modulated signal in order to recover the bit sequence. As was seen 
in the previous section with the square wave signal, if the gain parameter is too low, then the modulated signal will 
contain the original bit sequence in the envelope, and a low-pass filter will recover it. In Fig. 6, the gain parameter was 
set to ߚ෨ =3.4, which is sufficient to fully obscure the original bit sequence in the chaos, and a low-pass filter is 
ineffective to recover the original image. The encrypted image appears as noise in this case.  
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        Fig.6. Original Lena standard (left), encrypted version (center) and recovered (right), with matched parameters: 
Q=20, Λ=1e-4 , ࢼ෩ =3.4, TD= 0.05 µs, ࢻෝ૙ = 2. 
In the second test, the same Lena image is transmitted and recovered with three different levels of mismatch in 
the gain parameter: 0.1%, 0.2%, and 0.4%. No channel noise is simulated in this case. Figure 7 shows the recovered 
images for these mismatch values. The 0.1% mismatch causes a significant number of bit errors, but enough pixels 
remain in the recovered image that the original can visually be recognized. For 0.2% mismatch, the original image is 
barely recognizable, and fine details are lost. For 0.4%, the image appears as noise, and there is no hint of the original. 
The threshold level of mismatch, necessary to recover any aspect of the original image, is safely taken to be 0.3%. This 
threshold level is similar for the other three key parameters [17], creating a very robust key because it is extremely 
unlikely that all four parameters could be successfully guessed with thresholds this small. This encryption key strength is 
due to the fact that profiled beams are used in the simulation. Previous results with image encryption using uniform 
beams in the HAOF simulations indicated threshold values for recovery that were two orders of magnitude greater, in the 
range of 10-20%. In this case, the image data are not secure, because it is much more likely that the key could be 
guessed.  
 
Fig.7. Recovered Lena images with three levels of mismatch in the ࢼ෩ parameter: (a) 0.1% mismatch,  
(b) 0.2% mismatch, and (c) 0.4% mismatch.  
 
To measure the effect of random channel noise (with fixed variance, i.e., a non-uniform power spectral density) 
on the system, the simulation as illustrated in Fig.5 is modified by adding a random signal to the encrypted bit stream. 
There is no parameter mismatch in this case, and values of energy per bit to noise power (Eb/N0) are set to be 8 dB, 5 dB, 
and 1 dB, with corresponding bit error rates of 0.0073, 0.0338, and 0.1079, respectively. Figure 8 shows the effect of 
such channel noise on the recovered Lena image. These recovered images indicate that channel noise passes through the 
decryption process and creates pixel errors in the recovered image, without causing any other unpredictable distortion.  
Original Image Encrypted Image Recovered Image
(a) (b) (c)
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These findings indicate that under matched recovery, the chaotic encryption method allows reasonable signal recovery 
even with strong channel noise (at Eb/N0 ≈1 dB) being transmitted along with the encrypted signal. 
 
Fig.8. Recovered Lena images with three levels of channel noise power: (a) BER = 0.0073, Eb/N0= 8 dB,  
(b) BER =0.0338, Eb/N0=5 dB, (c) BER =0.1079, Eb/N0=1 dB.  
 
Digital image encryption and decryption naturally leads to video encryption, explored in the next section.  
4. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION OF VIDEO 
Video encryption and decryption may be achieved by transmitting and recovering one video frame at a time, in 
sequence. Here, however, an entire video data cube is transmitted and recovered at one time. The video consists of 95 
color frames with 240x320 pixels per frame and 24 bits per pixel. While the actual recovery involves a dynamic video, 
Fig.9 illustrates four (still) frames from the video clip, showing the original, encrypted, and recovered images assuming 
matched parameters were used in the transmitter and receiver HAOFs. With the chosen parameters, the original frames 
are completely hidden within the corresponding encrypted frames, which appear as noise. The results are consistent with 
what would be expected if the images were encrypted and recovered one at a time, in sequence. 
 
Fig.9. Encryption and recovery for four frames from a video, with the original frames in the top row, the encrypted 
frames in the middle row, and the recovered frames in the bottom row.  
(a) (b) (c)
Original Frame No.1
Encrypted Frame No.1
Recovered Frame No.1
Original Frame No.2
Encrypted Frame No.2
Recovered Frame No.2
Original Frame No.3
Encrypted Frame No.3
Recovered Frame No.3
Original Frame No.4
Encrypted Frame No.4
Recovered Frame No.4
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The effect of parameter mismatch on the video recovery, shown in Fig.10, is similar to the effect previously 
observed for single images. Figure 10 shows the recovery for the same four frames as in Fig.9, but with increasing levels 
of mismatch in the gain parameter. With a mismatch of 0.1% (top row), the original frames are clearly evident, with few 
pixel errors. A mismatch of 0.15% introduces a significant number of pixel errors (second row), although the original 
frame can still be seen. At a level of mismatch of 0.2% (third row), the original frames are barely discernable, and they 
are reduced to noise at a level of 0.3% (bottom row), where the original frame will be unrecoverable.  We note that these 
tolerance thresholds are comparable to those obtained for the single image case discussed earlier.  This indicates that the 
level of robustness of the encryption scheme is not impacted negatively by introducing dynamic images into the 
transmission system. 
 
 
Fig.10. Four recovered frames with different levels of mismatch in the gain parameter: 0.1% (top row),  
0.15% (second row), 0.2% (third row), and 0.3% (bottom row). 
 
 
 
5.     CONCLUSION  
The feasibility of chaotic encryption of images and video, using HAOF-based modulation, is clearly 
demonstrated here. The encrypted signal is shown to be not easily recoverable without precise knowledge of the key 
system parameters; however, the digital information can be recovered with high accuracy if the key is known. It is 
shown, for both image and video data, that parameter mismatch beyond a very small threshold destroys the recovery. 
This sensitivity, which leads to secure encryption, is due to the use of profiled beams in the simulation, which create 
stronger encryption than simulations assuming uniform input beams achieve. This result, although somewhat intuitive, is 
not analytically tractable; hence, this finding leads to the possibilities of much more robust and versatile encryptions, 
some of which are reported here.  Of special note is the fact that the use of profiled beams introduces a fourth key 
parameter, viz., the Q of the Bragg cell. This is because Q must be known for the decryption if profiled beams are used. 
Simulations of image encryption in the presence of channel noise indicate that recovery is possible with negligible bit 
errors when the ratio of energy per bit to noise power is about 10 dB or above; moreover, even for fairly high levels of 
noise power, with the energy per bit to noise reaching 1 dB or less, the recovery is not entirely destroyed. The current 
work will be extended to examine the application of the encryption system to medical imagery, and to combine the 
encryption with steganography in order to create a multi-layered system that securely embeds personal information 
within encrypted medical imagery. 
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